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It is shown
that concentrated labor markets call for more aggressive inﬂation stabilization.
This is because the central bank is able to induce wage restraint and to push
output towards Pareto eﬃciency by implementing tougher stabilization policies.
Moreover, the welfare cost of deviation from the optimal policy is increasing in
wage setting centralization. The analysis is performed in the context of a linear-
quadratic approach where the welfare measure is derived resorting to a second
order approximation to households’ lifetime utility.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, E52
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Unions, Inﬂation.
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The purpose of the paper is to design optimal monetary policy rules in a New-
Keynesian model featuring the presence of non-atomistic unions.NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The paper studies optimal monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model featuring
unionized labor markets. The analysis focuses on simple interest rate rules. It
is shown that the introduction of large wage setters has non-trivial implications
for monetary policy: the policy trade-oﬀ is modiﬁed depending on the degree
of wage-setting centralization and concentrated labor markets call for more ag-
gressive stabilization policies. Moreover, the welfare cost of deviating from the
optimal policy increases in the centralization of the wage bargaining process.
It is ﬁrst studied how the presence of large wage setters aﬀects the transmis-
sion channel of monetary policy. Big unions internalize the eﬀects of their wage
policy on inﬂation, anticipating that a rise in the wage produces inﬂationary
pressures and a consequent reduction of labor demand through monetary policy
tightening. Tougher inﬂation stabilization policies punish wage increases with a
harsher contraction of aggregate labor demand, giving unions the incentive to
restrain real wages. In this context, the central bank can raise long-run employ-
ment by implementing more aggressive stabilization policies. Therefore, policy
makers have an additional reason to stabilize inﬂation, other than the usual con-
cerns about relative price dispersion. Strategic interaction creates a transmission
mechanism of monetary policy acting via labor supply, rather than aggregate de-
mand. The eﬀectiveness of this channel increases in wage setting centralization,
as bigger unions internalize to a greater extent the impact of their wage policy
on inﬂation.
After characterizing how the transmission mechanism is altered, optimal mon-
etary policy analysis is performed. The central bank faces an additional trade-oﬀ
with respect to the one traditionally considered in the literature. In fact, steady
state eﬃciency can be enhanced only by increasing aggressiveness in stabilizing
inﬂation, or equivalently only by accepting a higher volatility of the output gap.
The more is centralized the wage bargaining process, the higher is the marginal
gain of stabilizing inﬂation in terms of steady state eﬃciency, as the eﬀective-
ness of the strategic interaction channel increases in labor market concentration.
Consequently, the optimal monetary policy stance is tighter. It turns out that
concentrated labor markets call for more aggressive stabilization policies.
Finally, it is computed the cost of deviating from optimal policy. Such a cost
is measured as the fraction of consumption that agents are willing to give up to
be indiﬀerent between the optimal policy and a given alternative regime. The
welfare cost is decomposed in order to disentangle steady state and stabilization
eﬀects of policy. The welfare analysis shows that most of the cost can be ac-
counted for by the steady state component. The result conﬁrms the intuition
that in the presence of concentrated labor markets it is optimal to tighten mon-
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October 20061 Introduction
Recent research widely relies on New-Keynesian (NK) models to provide guide-
lines in the design of optimal monetary policy rules. These models proved to
be particularly insightful in dealing with the issue in that they are grounded on
a framework allowing for welfare based policy evaluation. In particular, they
identify the variables that are relevant for welfare in a way that depends on the
microeconomic structure underlying the model economy. This allows to derive
a meaningful social welfare function that suggests to policy makers the optimal
reaction to distortions.
However, NK literature overlooks potential strategic interaction between pol-
icy makers and large wage setters, by assuming atomistic private agents. This
question is nevertheless of particular interest in the case of economies character-
ized by a signiﬁcant degree of centralization in the wage bargaining process. As
Table 1 and 2 show, several OECD countries feature a high degree of labor market
concentration. Moreover, the data suggest a considerable variation across coun-
tries along this dimension. Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether and how
the optimal monetary policy should react to diﬀerent labor market structures.
The topic has recently attracted the interest of a part of the literature, al-
though the existing studies have not yet exploited the tools developed by the
Iversen and Soskice
1 show that, in the presence of a
unionized labor force, the systematic behavior of the central bank has an im-
pact on labor supply decisions and, as a consequence, on the equilibrium level
of employment and production. These models are static and deterministic and
they do not provide any micro-foundation for inﬂation costs. Therefore, they
cannot deliver welfare based criteria for monetary policy design. It may be a
fruitful improvement upon the state of the art to merge the existing studies on
non-atomistic wage setters with the NK literature.
Gnocchi (2006) generalizes the basic NK model to allow for a unionized labor
force. Large wage setters anticipate that wage pressures will lead to a surge in
inﬂation and to labor demand reductions through monetary policy tightening.
Therefore, tougher inﬂation stabilization policies raise steady state employment
by restraining wage demands. Strategic interaction creates an additional channel
of transmission of monetary policy that goes through aggregate supply, rather
than aggregate demand. Optimal monetary policy in this framework is an open
question.
The goal of this paper is to allow for a non trivial policy trade-oﬀ in a NK
model augmented with unions and to study how such a trade-oﬀ is modiﬁed
depending on the labor market structure, in order to characterize the optimal
monetary policy. As a ﬁrst step the analysis is restricted to the case of simple
rules, while the case of the fully optimal policy is left to future research. The
1See also Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2006). Zanetti
(2005) develops a NK model to study the monetary policy implications of unionized labor markets.
His model however diﬀers from the one outlined here, since atomistic unions are assumed.
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(2000) and Lippi (2002, 2003) among others
New-Keynesian research program to address the issue.design of the optimal policy rule is performed by using the methodology intro-
duced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and further developed by Benigno
and Woodford (2005). The method resorts to a second order approximation to
households’ lifetime utility as an approximate welfare measure. Because of the
long-run non-neutrality of the rule, the welfare measure is decomposed in such a
way to disentangle the steady state and the stabilization eﬀects of policy.
The paper shows that the presence of large wage setters creates an additional
dimension of the policy trade-oﬀ with respect to the one traditionally considered
by the literature. This is because in a model with unions, being more aggres-
sive in stabilizing inﬂation allows to reduce steady state distortion by inducing
wage restraint. But, as tougher inﬂation stabilization policies amplify output
gap volatility, the policy maker has to trade-oﬀ steady state eﬃciency against
dynamic eﬃciency. Two are the forces underlying the policy dilemma: wage set-
ting centralization and the volatility of the cost push shock. Highly centralized
labor markets are associated to high gains of aggressiveness in terms of average
distortion. In fact, larger unions internalize more the impact of their wage policy
on inﬂation, making more eﬀective the strategic interaction channel of monetary
policy. On the other hand, the more volatile is the cost push shock, the more
costly is price stability in terms of gap ﬂuctuations. This implies a high cost of
reducing average distortion.
The two forces interact resolving the policy trade-oﬀ and determining the
following optimal policy results.
If the volatility of the cost push shock is suﬃciently low and the concentra-
tion of the labor market is high enough, strict inﬂation targeting is optimal. A
high volatility of the cost push shock induces the policy maker to accept some
volatility of inﬂation. However, optimal aggressiveness increases in labor market
concentration. Finally, a decomposition of the approximate welfare measure al-
lows to compute the cost of deviating from the optimal policy and to decompose
the total eﬀect in steady state cost and stabilization cost. It is showed that the
steady state cost, as a fraction of the total, decreases with the standard deviation
of the cost push shock and increases with wage setting centralization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy,
Section 3 derives and gives an economic interpretation of the welfare criterion,
Section 4 computes the optimal simple interest rate rule. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of a continuum of households and ﬁrms and a ﬁnite
number of unions. Households and ﬁrms are modelled as in the baseline NK
model with goods prices staggered ` a la Calvo (1983)2. The main diﬀerences
with respect to the standard framework are in the structure of the labor market.
Households indeed delegate wage setting decisions to unions and, for given wage,
2For derivations of the baseline model I refer to Calvo (1983), Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999),
Gal´ ı (2003), Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003)
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markets.
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate, reacting to endogenous vari-
ations in inﬂation according to the following policy rule
it = ρ + γππt (1)
where it is the log of the nominal interest rate factor, ρ is the steady state level
of it, inﬂation is deﬁned as πt = logPt − logPt−1 and γπ > 1.
It is assumed that the ﬁscal policy is responsible for oﬀsetting the static
distortions arising because of imperfectly competitive goods markets, while, dif-
ferently from the baseline model, the ineﬃciency arising in labor markets is not
corrected for. Lump-sum transfers and taxes are available and they are free to
adjust in order to balance the government budget constraint at all times.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households indexed
by i on the unit interval [0,1], each of them consumes a continuum of diﬀerenti-
ated goods and supplies a diﬀerentiated labor type. Households have preferences













where C is aggregate consumption, obtained aggregating in the Dixit-Stiglitz














and the parameter θp > 1 is representing the elasticity of substitution among
















3The analysis is restricted to the case of log utility. In this case not only the model is more tractable,
but the policy analysis is particularly intuitive and transparent. An additional appendix, which is
available upon request, shows that all results derived here continue to hold in the more general case
of a CRRA utility function.
4The price index has the property that the minimum cost of a consumption bundle Ct is PtCt
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Ct,i + δt,t+1Bt,i ≤ Bt−1,i +
Wt,i
Pt
Lt,i + Tt,i + Divt,i (6)
δt,t+1 is the price vector of a state contingent asset paying one unit of consumption
in a particular state of nature in period t+1, Bt is the vector of the corresponding
state contingent claims purchased by the household and Bt−1 the value of the
claims for the current realization of the state of nature.
Wt,i
Pt Lt,i represents real
labor income. Finally, each consumer receives a share Divt,i of the aggregate
proﬁts and lump-sum government transfers Tt,i. Households maximize their life-
time utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (6) choosing state contingent
paths of consumption and assets. Optimal allocation of consumption over time
implies the standard Euler equation
C−1
t = Et[β(1 + Rt)C−1





Rt, the risk-free real interest rate, is the rate of return of an asset that pays
one unit of consumption in every state of nature at time t+1 and the risk-free
nominal interest rate, It, is the rate of return of an asset that yields one unit of
currency in every state of nature at time t+1. Integrating (5) across households,





















then the clearing of all goods markets
Yt,f = Ct,f (10)
implies
Yt = Ct (11)


















Equation (12) fully describes the aggregate demand block of the model: it relates
aggregate output demand to inﬂation, conditionally on expectations about future
variables. Note that the reaction of output to inﬂation depends on central bank’s
aggressiveness in stabilizing inﬂation.
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Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, indexed by f on the
interval [0,1], each producing a diﬀerentiated good using a continuum of labor
types according to the following constant return to scale technology
Yt(f) = AtLt,f (14)
Productivity (TFP), denoted by At, follows an autoregressive process represented
by
logAt+1 = ρalogAt + εt+1,a (15)
where εt is white noise with standard deviation σε,a. The eﬀective labor input










The parameter θw > 1 is representing the elasticity of substitution among labor
types. Firms do not have market power in the labor market, then they take
















Firms set the price in order to maximize proﬁts, subject to the constraint that
demand must be satisﬁed at the posted price, according to equation (8). Prices
are set in staggered contracts with random duration as in Calvo (1983): in any
period each ﬁrm faces a constant probability 1 − α to reoptimize and charge a
new price. A subsidy is used by the ﬁscal authority to undo the steady state
distortion induced by ﬁrms’ market power in the goods markets. The deﬁnition




























5As for the price index, aggregate wage has the property that the minimum cost of a unit of
composite labor input Lt is WtLt
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Note that (22) and (23) can be expressed recursively as










Equation (21) fully describes the aggregate supply block of the model: it relates
aggregate output supply to inﬂation, conditionally on expectations about future
variables.
Finally, it can be easily shown that the aggregate production function is given
by
Yt∆t = AtLt (26)
where ∆t







and represents a measure of relative price dispersion, evolving according to the
law











6It can be proved that log(∆) is a function of the cross sectional variance of relative prices and it
is of second order.
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The economy is populated by a ﬁnite number of unions indexed by j, where j ∈
{1,...,n}, n ≥ 2. All workers are unionized and they split equally among unions
so that each union has mass n−1. The mass can be interpreted as the degree
of wage setting centralization (CWS) as well as unions’ ability to internalize the
consequences of their actions. As a matter of fact, the higher is the number of
unions the lower is their mass and then the lower the impact of union’s j wage
policy on aggregate variables.
It is assumed that wages are fully ﬂexible and any possibility of pre-commitment
to future wage policies is ruled out. Each union j sets the real wage on behalf of
her members to maximize their lifetime utility function (2) subject to the budget
constraint7 (6) and labor demand (20) for all members i ∈ j. Unions set wages
simultaneously and each of them takes other unions’ real wages as given.
The assumption that wage setters have positive mass is key for the outcome
of the model. Since unions are non-atomistic, they internalize the impact of their
wage policy on the aggregate wage. Then they also realize that an increase in
union’s j wage creates inﬂationary pressures via the price setting rule of ﬁrms,
inducing the central bank to contract aggregate demand, and then aggregate la-
bor demand. Formally, the aggregate wage index (16), aggregate demand (12),
the production function (26) and the short run aggregate supply (21) are inter-
nalized on top of the budget constraint (6) and labor demand (20). It follows
that aggregate labor demand is a function of
Wj,t
Pt through the monetary policy
rule. The elasticity of aggregate labor demand to changes in the wage is8
ΣL = γπ
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
(29)
implying the following elasticity of labor demand perceived by the j-th union for
each of her members







This is a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution among labor types and
the elasticity of aggregate labor demand, which is in turn an increasing function
of γπ. This is because the more is restrictive the policy stance, the harsher will
be the contraction of aggregate demand as a reaction to inﬂation variability,
with the consequence of making labor demand more sensitive to a variation in
the wage. The eﬀect is increasing in the mass of the union as larger unions
7Fiscal policy and dividends are taken as given, as it is usually assumed in the literature. See Lippi
(2002, 2003)
8For the derivation of ΣL see Appendix B. Note that ΣL is not constant over time. However, you
can show that, for empirically relevant values of the parameters and for the calibrations considered
below, elasticity ﬂuctuations do not generate quantitatively signiﬁcant variation out of the steady
state at a second-order accuracy. To this purpose the model has been approximated to second order
and simulated using the method developed by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004). Then it is assumed in
the rest of the paper that elasticity is constantly equal to its steady state value. This is inconsequential
also for the results obtained in the welfare analysis.
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that price stickiness enters negatively through the elasticity of aggregate labor
demand. Indeed, when price stickiness raises, the fraction of ﬁrms re-optimizing
in each period is lower. Therefore, also the impact of a change in the real wage
on inﬂation, and then on aggregate output through central bank’s reaction, has
to be lower.









Index j has been dropped because of symmetry. The ﬁrst order condition for
unions has the same form as in the standard case with atomistic wage setters.
The real wage in fact is set at a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution.
However, the mark-up depends not only on the elasticity of substitution among
labor types, but also on the number of unions and on central bank’s aggres-
siveness in stabilizing inﬂation. Tough inﬂation stabilization policies discourage
wage pressures by punishing a wage increase with a contraction of aggregate
demand. Note ﬁnally that unions have been modelled in such a way that the
case of non-atomistic wage setters nests the two limiting cases of monopolisti-
cally competitive and perfectly competitive labor markets. When the number of
unions tends to inﬁnity, the wage mark-up becomes θw
θw−1. Alternatively, if the
elasticity of substitution between labor types tends to inﬁnity, the wage collapses
to the competitive level.
An unpleasant feature of the baseline NK model with nominal price rigidity is
the lack of a non-trivial policy trade-oﬀ, which is perceived to be as an empirically
relevant problem by any central banker: it is needed to create a tension between
inﬂation and output gap stabilization. Therefore, it is assumed from now on that
the wage mark-up is ﬂuctuating exogenously around its mean value9. The ﬁrst











t follows an autoregressive process represented by
µw
t+1 = ρuµw
t + εt+1,u (33)
where εt,u is white noise with standard deviation denoted by σε,u.
2.4 The Pareto Optimum
For the subsequent analysis it is useful to derive the Pareto eﬃcient level of
output, consumption and labor. Pareto eﬃciency requires that the marginal
9This can be seen as a shortcut to include other forms of nominal rigidities, such as wage stickiness.
See also Clarida et al. (1999), Gal´ ı (2003) and Woodford (2003)
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The goods market clearing condition (11) and the production function (26), can
be used to get the Pareto eﬃcient values of output
Y ∗
t = At (35)
and employment
L∗
t = 1 (36)
Hence, at the non-stochastic steady state
Y ∗ = C∗ = L∗ = 1
2.5 The Sticky Price Equilibrium
It is convenient to rewrite allocations in a compact form. Let xt = (Yt,Πt,∆t)
and Xt = (Ft,Kt). Given ∆−1, exogenous stochastic processes At and µw
t and
given a value for the policy parameter γπ, the rational expectation equilibrium
for the sticky price economy is a process {xt,Xt}∞






















































(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
which can be easily obtained using equations (11), (12), (19), (21), (24), (25),
(26), (28), (30) and (32).
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The non-stochastic steady state of the model is derived setting the shocks to
their mean value. It is straightforward to prove that the steady state level of
the gross inﬂation rate and price dispersion are equal to one, using aggregate
demand and the law of motion for price dispersion. Moreover, from the short
run aggregate supply and the deﬁnition of the auxiliary variables Kt and Ft, we
can obtain the steady state value of output, employment and consumption








Some conclusions can be drawn looking at the steady state level of employment
(37).
First, recall from (36) that the eﬃcient level of employment is L∗
t = 1. Hence,
the steady state is not Pareto eﬃcient: imperfect substitutability of labor types
and the presence of unions drive a wedge between the marginal productivity of
labor and the marginal rate of substitution, determining a suboptimal employ-
ment equilibrium level. As market power on the goods markets is oﬀset by ﬁscal
policy, the steady state distortion is coming exclusively from the labor market
side.
Second, the steady state is not independent of the monetary policy rule.
This is because the central bank is able to induce wage restraint by implementing
tougher stabilization policies. Then the steady state level of employment, output
and consumption are increasing functions of the coeﬃcient entering the Taylor
rule. It turns out that the strategic behavior of unions creates a new channel of
transmission of monetary policy. The outcome of the model does not challenge
the conventional neutrality result: a transitory shock to the nominal interest rate
dies oﬀ in the long-run and leaves the steady state unaﬀected. However, the way
in which the central bank systematically behaves has an impact on real economic
activity.
Moreover, the labor market structure interacts with monetary policy in de-
termining the long-run equilibrium values of the real variables. In fact, the way
in which a change in the degree of wage setting centralization aﬀects equilibrium
depends on the monetary policy stance: a less unionized labor market enhances
welfare, provided that monetary policy is not too aggressive in stabilizing inﬂa-
tion. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to look at the elasticity of labor demand (30). As
it is a weighted average between θw and ΣL, where the weights are respectively
1 − 1/n and 1/n, η increases in n if and only if θw > ΣL. This is equivalent to
say that η increases in n if and only if
γπ ≤ ¯ γπ (38)
where
¯ γπ ≡ θw
α
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raises long-run employment only when (38) is satisﬁed. This result is quite intu-
itive. The presence of unions has two opposite eﬀects: on one hand the higher
market power tends to depress employment; on the other, the strategic interac-
tion channel of monetary policy tends to increase employment restraining real
wage demands. The second eﬀect decreases with the number of unions. When
the central bank is aggressive, the wage restraint induced by monetary policy is
very important and it may be excessively costly to reduce the degree of wage
setting centralization. When (38) is satisﬁed, the argument is reversed and the
lower is the mass of the unions, the higher is welfare. For a sensible calibration
of parameters, the threshold value of γπ is much higher than the one empirically
observed10. Then, for empirically plausible values of parameters, a decentraliza-
tion in the wage bargaining process is welfare enhancing. This seems to be in
contrast with a part of the literature, pointing towards a hump-shaped relation
between centralization of wage setting and employment. However, this is because
the model is well deﬁned only for n ≥ 2. A single encompassing union would act
as a planner and would behave so as to attain Pareto eﬃciency, independently of
monetary policy. Then, if the case n = 1 is included, the model produces a hump-
shaped relation between wage setting centralization and employment. Moreover,
with a single union, the strategic interaction channel of monetary policy would
not be active, as in the case of atomistic wage setters. This is consistent with
the literature and with the empirical evidence, suggesting that the central bank
interacts strategically with large wage setters only at intermediate levels of labor
market concentration.











This case is known in the literature as strict inﬂation targeting. When the
coeﬃcient entering the Taylor rule tends to inﬁnity, inﬂation is on target not only
on average, but also period by period. Since the target inﬂation rate implied by
the speciﬁed Taylor rule is zero, strict inﬂation targeting allows the central bank
to achieve price stability, also outside the steady state. The model predicts that
strict inﬂation targeting implements Pareto eﬃciency in the long-run through the
non-neutrality of the policy rule. This creates an additional reason to penalize
inﬂation variability other than the usual concern about relative price distortion.
Before introducing the policy problem, it is convenient to deﬁne a measure
of average distortion. A reasonable candidate is the wedge between marginal
productivity and the marginal rate of substitution. While the eﬃcient steady
state implies the following marginal rate of substitution
mrs∗ = (L∗)φC = 1




Working Paper Series No 690
October 2006at the actual steady state
mrs = LφC = 1 − η−1
so that Φ ≡ η−1 can be deﬁned as a measure of steady state ineﬃciency.
3 The Policy Problem
The previous section analyzes the behavior of private agents and unions when
the central bank credibly commits to a monetary policy rule. The policy problem
faced by the central bank can then be described as the choice of the coeﬃcients
entering the rule, taking into account the reaction of the agents to the policy
commitment.
I wish to ﬁnd the optimal monetary policy rule within a class of simple and
implementable rules of the kind described by equation (1). A rule is said to be
implementable if it brings about a locally unique rational expectation equilib-
rium in a neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state, under the assumption
of suﬃciently tightly bounded exogenous processes. An implementable rule is
optimal, within the particular family of policies taken into consideration, if it
yields the highest value for a suitably deﬁned welfare criterion.
The deﬁnition of such a criterion and the analysis of its implications for the
monetary policy problem are the objects of the section. The issue is addressed
using the linear-quadratic approach introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and further developed by Benigno and Woodford (2005). Because of the
long-run non-neutrality of the rule, the welfare measure is decomposed in such a
way to disentangle the steady state and the stabilization eﬀects of policy.
Optimality is judged from a timeless perspective. For a policy to be optimal in
this sense, it is suﬃcient to limit central bank’s ability to exploit the expectations
already in place at the time the commitment is chosen.
3.1 The Welfare Criterion













It might seem natural to deﬁne the optimal policy rule at time zero as the
one that maximizes (41) subject to the constraints imposed by the behavior of
the private sector. However, the use of (41) leads to a time inconsistent selection
of the rule. This is because the optimal choice correctly takes into account the
eﬀects of policy on future expectations, but not on the expectations formed prior
to time zero. Past expectations about current outcomes are in fact given at the
time of policy selection. As a consequence, should the policy be reconsidered at
a later period, the new commitment would not be a continuation of the original
plan: the policy maker has the incentive to fool the agents whenever she has
17
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problem, I closely follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) who propose to penalize
the rules exploiting the expectations already in place at the time the commitment
is chosen. According to their method the welfare criterion can be deﬁned in
three steps. The intuition of the procedure is described below while I refer to
the appendix for the technical details.
First, one needs to characterize the unconstrained timelessly optimal policy.
The term unconstrained here refers to the fact that the optimal policy does not
necessarily need to be implemented by a simple policy rule of the kind described
by equation (1). Note also that, diﬀerently from the case studied by Benigno and
Woodford (2005), average distortion is controlled by the monetary authority.
Second, it is computed the gain of fooling the agents, that is the value of
choosing a policy that does not validate past expectations about current equi-
librium outcomes. This is equivalent to compute the gain of deviating from the
timelessly optimal plan.
Finally, the welfare criterion is constructed by subtracting from U0 the gain
of fooling the agents, Ψ(µw,0), associated to the policy under scrutiny
ˆ U0 = U0 − Ψ(µw,0)
Since Ψ(µw,0) is a function of the whole history of cost push disturbances up
to time zero, it is computed the unconditional expected value of the modiﬁed
welfare criterion, integrating over all possible histories of shocks. A second order


































α and ¯ U is the steady state level of utility. All variables are
expressed in log deviations from the non-stochastic steady state and the welfare
relevant output gap
ˆ xt ≡ ˆ yt − ˆ y∗
t
is deﬁned as the output deviation from a properly deﬁned target
ˆ y∗





The welfare criterion can be used not only to determine the rule that is
optimal within a given class, but also to compute the cost of deviating from
the optimized rule. Consider two policy regimes, R (reference) and A (alterna-







t=0). Then the associated welfare is
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t ,LR}∞
t=0) and UA = U({CA
t ,LA}∞
t=0)
Let the cost of regime A be denoted by γ. I measure γ as the fraction of regime
R’s consumption that households would be willing to give up in order to be as






It can be easily shown that, given the functional form of the utility function
γ = 1 − exp{(1 − β)(UA − UR)} (43)
3.2 Average Distortion, Inﬂation Stabilization and Wel-
fare
A well deﬁned approximate welfare measure allows to analyze what are the ob-
jectives of a benevolent central bank willing to choose the state-contingent path
of the economic variables preferred by the private sector. It turns out that, dif-
ferently from a standard NK framework, the evaluation of alternative policies
cannot disregard possible eﬀects stemming from the policy rule non-neutrality
due to the presence of unionized labor markets.
In fact, the welfare function can be decomposed into two parts: a stabiliza-





















and a steady state component measuring the welfare eﬀects due to a change in















The stabilization component provides a rationale for minimizing inﬂation
and output gap deviations from properly deﬁned targets. Inﬂation ﬂuctuations
are penalized in that they create unnecessary variability in the relative price
dispersion. The target level of inﬂation is zero, because only complete price
stability would remove any dispersion in relative prices. Fluctuations in the
output gap are also costly. This is because price stickiness implies ineﬃcient
changes in the average mark-up charged by ﬁrms. As in the case of atomistic
agents studied by Benigno and Woodford (2005), the output target is a linear
combination of the natural and the eﬃcient output
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t = Φˆ yn










is the natural output and the eﬃcient output is
ˆ yFB
t = at (48)
The case of non-atomistic agents exhibits however an interesting additional
feature. For the policy rule has permanent real eﬀects, steady state distortion,
which is commonly disregarded as independent of policy, cannot be taken as
given in a model featuring the presence of large wage setters. In particular,
when alternative policy rules are evaluated on welfare theoretical grounds, one
cannot abstract from the contribution of the steady state component WStSt
0 .
Looking at (45), two are the channels through which average distortion aﬀects
welfare. The ﬁrst one is represented by the term
¯ U(Φ)
1 − β
This is the discounted steady state level of utility, which is a decreasing function
of Φ. Recall that Φ is the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the
marginal rate of transformation. As long as Φ is positive, the agents are willing
to give up leisure in exchange for consumption at a rate that is on average higher
than the one implied by the technological constraints. Hence, they would be
better oﬀ consuming less leisure and more goods. Tougher stabilization policies
induce unions to restrain wages, increasing the steady state level of employment











isolates the negative eﬀect of ineﬃcient wage mark-up ﬂuctuations. When the
steady state is non distorted, this term disappears and wage mark-up ﬂuctuations
do not matter per se but only to the extent they create output gap variability.
Only when the steady state is distorted, changes in the mark-up directly and
negatively aﬀect welfare. The result is quite intuitive: though transitory, in-
eﬃcient ﬂuctuations add on top of a positive and permanent level of average
distortion, then it would be welfare improving to smooth them over the cycle. It
can be proved that the steady state component is strictly decreasing in average
distortion11.
11There exists a threshold value for the variance of the cost push shock such that, above that
threshold, steady state welfare is not monotone decreasing in average distortion. However, for those
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of how the policy problem is aﬀected by the strategic interaction channel of
monetary policy. Big players in the labor markets internalize the consequences of
their actions on aggregate variables. This gives the monetary authority a chance
of controlling average distortion that in turn reduces welfare through the two
channels described above. As a consequence, the central bank has an additional
reason to stabilize inﬂation other than the usual concern about relative price
dispersion: the policy maker has to face an additional dilemma.
3.3 The Trade-Oﬀ: an Additional Dimension
Being the welfare criterion purely quadratic, it is suﬃcient to approximate the
structural equations to ﬁrst order, to obtain an approximation to the optimal
policy at a ﬁrst order accuracy. Hence, the policy problem consists in selecting
the inﬂation coeﬃcient entering the policy rule in order to maximize ˆ W0 subject
to the following log-linear constraints
ˆ xt = Etˆ xt+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − r∗
t) (49)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κˆ xt + (1 − Φ)λµw
t (50)
where (49) is the IS equation and (50) is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC). r∗
t is a composite disturbance deﬁned as follows
r∗





Looking at the policy problem, it is possible to isolate an additional dimension
of the trade-oﬀ with respect to the one traditionally studied in the literature.
Because of the cost push disturbance, it is not feasible to fully stabilize inﬂa-
tion and output gap simultaneously: it is possible to reduce inﬂation volatility
only at the cost of increasing gap volatility. This is the classical trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and output gap stabilization. In an economy populated by atomistic
agents, its solution determines optimal ﬂuctuations and provides a complete de-
scription of optimal monetary policy. In a model with unions, however, this
is not the end of the story. It may be optimal to deviate from those optimal
ﬂuctuations in exchange for less average distortion. But the only way to reduce
average distortion is by being more aggressive in stabilizing inﬂation. Therefore,
static eﬃciency can be enhanced only at the cost of more volatility in the output
gap. In other words, static eﬃciency is costly in terms of dynamic eﬃciency: this
is the additional dilemma faced by the policy maker.
The economic intuition suggests that the key forces underlying the new policy
trade-oﬀ are the standard deviation of the cost push shock relatively to the TFP
shock, as in the baseline NK model, and wage setting centralization. The higher
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price stability relatively to gap stability. Then, also the cost of reducing average
distortion has to be higher in terms of dynamic eﬃciency. On the other hand,
the more the labor market is concentrated, the bigger are unions and then the
stronger is the strategic interaction channel of monetary policy. This implies
that being tough in stabilizing inﬂation pays more in terms of average distortion,
so that the additional dimension of the trade-oﬀ gains importance relatively to
the traditional stabilization concerns.
4 Optimal Simple Policy Rules
I turn now to the design of the optimal simple rule which is subsequently used
as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of alternative suboptimal rules.
The welfare criterion is computed analytically. However, welfare maximization
is performed numerically over a grid since ﬁrst order conditions do not have a
closed form solution. Before stating the optimal monetary policy results, it is
useful to study the behavior of the welfare function.
It has been established so far that, under a timeless perspective, a benevolent
































subject to the constraints imposed by private agents’ behavior
ˆ xt = Etˆ xt+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − r∗
t)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κˆ xt + (1 − Φ)λµw
t
Using the IS equation, the Phillips curve and the policy rule the equilibrium
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The system has a unique solution and the state-contingent evolution of inﬂation
and output gap is
πt = fπ,aat + fπ,uµw
t (52)
ˆ xt = fx,aat + fx,uµw
t (53)
where fπ,a, fπ,u, fx,a and fx,u are a function of structural parameters and of the
coeﬃcients entering the policy rule. The solution of inﬂation and output gap
are used in the welfare criterion to solve for expectations. Finally, (42) can be
related to the monetary policy stance.































π,u + ˜ λf2
x,u) + fπ,uλΓ (54)
Appendix D and E show how to recover coeﬃcients fπ,a, fπ,u, fx,a and fx,u and
function (54). Γ and ˜ λ are convolutions of parameters deﬁned in the Appendix.
Before computing the optimal monetary policy, it is instructive to look at the
shape of the welfare criterion and to study how it changes when CWS and RS
vary. In order to plot the welfare function it is considered a range of values for
the monetary policy stance, chosen from an equally spaced grid on the interval
[1.25,125]. The length of each subinterval is ﬁxed to 0.25. Given the very high
value of the upper bound of the grid, a policy setting γπ = 125 is referred to as
strict inﬂation targeting. Parameters are calibrated as it is reported in Table 3.
These values are conventionally used in the NK literature. It has been checked
that results are robust to alternative plausible calibrations. Concerning the cost
push shock, autocorrelation is set to zero while alternative calibrations of σε,u are
considered in order to match diﬀerent values of the relative standard deviation, as
it is displayed in Table 4. It is labelled as high, medium or low a cost push shock
standard deviation that is respectively twenty, ten or ﬁve times TFP standard
deviation. These are the three representative cases commented below. Note that
in general the values considered for the standard deviation of the cost push shock
are quite high. Hence the calibration is relatively conservative in the sense that
results are biased against the argument that unionized labor markets matter for
optimal monetary policy.
Two are the main results suggested by the numerical analysis.
First, given wage setting centralization and the chosen bounds for aggres-
siveness in inﬂation stabilization, you can ﬁnd a value of the relative standard
deviation, RS∗, such that if RS < RS∗ strict inﬂation targeting performs bet-
ter than any other policy considered within the bounds. If relative standard
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This is because a high relative standard deviation implies high marginal costs of
over-stabilizing inﬂation relatively to marginal gains in terms of average distor-
tion: the stabilization dimension of the trade-oﬀ dominates the second one. The
intuition is conﬁrmed looking at the graphs.
The left hand panel of Figure 1 displays the welfare criterion for an economy
with three unions and low RS. The function is strictly increasing in the inﬂation
coeﬃcient, hence strict inﬂation targeting is the optimal policy. The right hand
panel shows the welfare cost of deviating from the optimized value. To grasp
some insight, total welfare is decomposed in steady state and stabilization com-
ponent in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. In both charts the solid line represents
actual welfare while the dotted line is the value that corresponds to the inﬂation
coeﬃcient maximizing total welfare. Looking at Figures 2 and 3, it is immediate
to see that in the optimal policy the steady state component is maximized while
the stabilization component is not. Hence, given the degree of concentration in
the labor markets a low RS resolves the trade-oﬀ between stabilization and aver-
age distortion in favor of the latter. The opposite is observed in the case of a high
RS. Figure 4 again displays total welfare for an economy with three unions. Now
the function has a maximum. If the eﬀect of policy is decomposed, as in Figure
5 and 6, it is evident that the stabilization part is maximized while steady state
welfare is not. The additional dilemma is dominated by the traditional concerns
about stabilization.
Then, it can be inferred that the higher is the relative standard deviation
of the cost push shock the less labor market unionization matters in terms of
optimal monetary policy.
The second result is that RS∗ is increasing with the centralization of wage
setting: it is more likely to prefer strict inﬂation targeting when labor markets are
concentrated. The intuition is that high CWS implies high steady state marginal
gains from inﬂation stabilization. Once again it is insightful to have a look at
the plots.
Consider the case of three unions and low, high or medium RS as depicted in
Figures 1, 4 and 7 respectively. It can be easily seen that RS∗=MEDIUM, i.e.
if the relative standard deviation of the cost push shock is higher than or equal
to the medium value, then strict inﬂation targeting is not optimal. However,
if you consider the case with two unions as in ﬁgures 8 and 9, it is clear that
RS∗=HIGH. This means that when the degree of CWS increases it is needed a
higher volatility of the cost push shock to rule out strict inﬂation targeting as
the optimal policy.
With a clear intuition of how the welfare criterion is aﬀected by the key forces
underlying the policy trade-oﬀ, it is straightforward to interpret the optimal
12The apparent discontinuity is induced only by the fact that the welfare function is evaluated
numerically over a grid. The most plausible conjecture, however, is that it can always be found
a maximum if the upper bound of the grid is suﬃciently high. Moreover, the results considered
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Taylor rule that maximizes the welfare criterion over the grid. Table 5 shows the
value of γπ as a function of the degree of centralization of wage setting and of the
relative standard deviation of the cost push shock. The main result is that the
optimal stance is always increasing in the centralization of the wage bargaining
process. Interestingly, if the volatility of the cost push shock is suﬃciently low
and the concentration of the labor market is high enough, then strict inﬂation
targeting is optimal even in the presence of ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations of output.
This is the case of low RS and 2, 3 or 5 unions. On the other hand, for high
values of the volatility of the cost push shock, the policy maker accepts some
volatility of inﬂation as in the standard NK model. However, the more the labor
market is concentrated, the higher is the optimal aggressiveness.
Then, it can be concluded that the optimal policy is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
the labor market structure.
Welfare analysis allows to assess more closely the relevance of the changes
induced in the policy prescriptions by the presence of a unionized labor force.
Tables 6 and 7 display the welfare cost of adopting an ad-hoc Taylor rule with
a coeﬃcient γπ = 1.5 instead of the optimal one. The two extreme cases of high
and low RS are considered for an economy characterized by 2, 3 or 15 unions.
If RS is high, welfare costs are almost entirely accounted for by the stabi-
lization component that is however implausibly high (always more than three
percentage points). In the case of N = 2 the steady state cost is not negligible
(0.2473 percentage points of consumption) while it is not signiﬁcant for N = 3
and N = 15 (less than a hundredth of a percentage point). On the other hand,
if RS is low and the labor market is highly concentrated (as in the case of N = 2
or N = 3), not only the steady state component is not negligible, it is also the
most important part of the welfare cost. Finally, if the wage bargaining process
is suﬃciently decentralized, as for N = 15, the steady state component is again
negligible as in the case of high RS.
Hence, welfare analysis suggests that both the total and the steady state cost
of deviating from the optimal policy are increasing in the centralization of wage
setting. In particular, the steady state cost as a fraction of the total increases
with CWS and decreases with the relative standard deviation of the cost push
shock.
We can conclude that, unless implausibly high values for the standard devia-
tion of the cost push shock are assumed, it is costly to disregard the labor mar-
ket structure as a determinant of the optimal monetary policy. This is because
the central bank can induce wage restraint and then reduce average distortion
through aggressive inﬂation stabilization. The gains stemming from aggressive-
ness are greater than the costs associated to a higher variability of the output gap.
The fact that that most of the cost is coming from the steady state component
is in line with the economic intuition.
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The paper studies whether and how the labor market structure aﬀects the mone-
tary policy problem in a model with nominal rigidities and non-atomistic unions.
In particular, it is computed the optimal simple interest rate rule as a function
of the degree of wage setting centralization.
The main ﬁnding is that the optimal aggressiveness in stabilizing inﬂation
is increasing in wage setting centralization. Moreover, the relevance of policy
prescriptions is assessed resorting to welfare analysis. It turns out that it is
signiﬁcantly costly to disregard possible ineﬃciencies stemming from high degrees
of centralization of the bargaining process.
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Considering that the representative union takes as given the wage of the workers

































the result follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the real aggregate wage
index. The last equality holds because of symmetry at equilibrium. Note that,












B Appendix: Labor Demand Elasticity
The elasticity of labor demand perceived by the j-th union can be derived in
three steps
Step 1: The elasticity of inﬂation to the aggregate real wage
















At the zero inﬂation steady state
ΣΠ =
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wage index
Aggregate labor demand is a function of aggregate demand faced by ﬁrms. The
elasticity of aggregate labor to aggregate demand is constant and equal to 1. It
follows from aggregate demand (12) and the elasticity of inﬂation to the aggregate







ΣΠ,t = γπΣΠ,t (61)
At the zero inﬂation steady state
ΣL = γπ
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
(62)
Step 3: The elasticity of type j labor demand to union’s j real wage








Equation (63) allows the j-th wage setter to compute the perceived elasticity of
its own labor demand with respect to the real wage charged (diﬀerently from
the standard case, aggregate labor is NOT taken as given, but it is perceived
to be a function of the real wage through the strategic interaction with the central





























θw is assumed to be such that labor demand is elastic, that is η > 1. It is
immediate to see from (64) that labor elasticity is not constant over time. This
implies that the wage mark-up ﬂuctuates over time. At the zero inﬂation steady
state







(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
(65)
Equations (11), (12), (19), (21), (24), (25), (26), (28), (30), (32), and (64) to-
gether with the speciﬁcation of exogenous processes and an initial value for price
dispersion ∆ fully characterize the equilibrium dynamics.
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The welfare criterion (42) is derived using the method proposed by Benigno
and Woodford (2005) for the evaluation of suboptimal policy rules. First, it is
characterized the timelessly optimal policy, i.e. an optimal policy that validates
private sector’s expectations at time zero. Then it is computed an approximation
to the value of deviating from the timelessly optimal policy. That value is ﬁnally
subtracted from the second order approximation of households’ lifetime utility.
In the case of non-atomistic wage setters the procedure diﬀers with respect
to the one treated in Benigno and Woodford (2005) in that average distortion is
not independent of policy. However it can be shown that the timelessly optimal
problem can be suitably redeﬁned and solved in two steps: the determination of
the timelessly optimal allocation as a function of average distortion and then the
choice of the average distortion that maximizes households’ utility subject to the
constraint of implementing a timelessly optimal allocation.
This further complication makes convenient to introduce the notion of time-
lessly optimal ﬂuctuations (or timelessly optimal stabilization policy). Recall
that xt = (Yt,Πt,∆t) and Xt = (Ft,Kt).
Deﬁnition 1: Let {x∗
t(Φ),X∗
t (Φ)}∞















































0 and a value for average distortion Φ. If X∗
0 is
chosen in such a way that {x∗
t(Φ),X∗
t (Φ)}∞
t=0 is a time invariant function of
exogenous states13, then {x∗
t(Φ),X∗
t (Φ)}∞
t=0 is deﬁned to be the timelessly optimal
stabilization policy.
13see Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002)
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it is in other terms the best response to shocks, given a certain degree of aver-
age distortion. In line with the timeless perspective, the initial value of forward
looking variables is constrained in the stabilization policy problem. Technically,
these constraints allow to make recursive a problem that naturally is not. Eco-
nomically, imposing those constraints is equivalent to ask the policy maker not
to take advantage of expectations already in place at the time of choosing the
commitment.
If the central bank were not constrained by a simple rule, she could choose
whatever degree of average distortion she liked, Φ∗, and then implement the
timelessly optimal stabilization policy consistent with that degree of average




then be a full characterization of the timelessly optimal policy. Formally the
follow deﬁnition applies.
Deﬁnition 2: Let {x∗
t,X∗
t ,Φ∗}∞

















t=0 is deﬁned to be the timelessly
optimal policy.
Hence, the timelessly optimal policy problem can be broken in two steps:
ﬁrst the choice of optimal ﬂuctuations compatible with any degree of average
distortion and then the choice of average distortion or, equivalently, the choice
of the non-stochastic steady state.
Concerning the second step, it is assumed that whenever the bank has the
chance to choose monetary policy without restricting to a simple rule, the best
average distortion is zero. This amounts to assume that the marginal beneﬁts
of reducing average distortion are greater than the marginal costs. It has been
checked numerically that this is always the case for all calibrations considered
here.
The rest of the section develops as follows: section 1 characterizes and ap-
proximates to ﬁrst order the timelessly optimal stabilization policy; section 2
derives the welfare criterion for the evaluation of simple policy rules.
C.1 Timelessly Optimal Fluctuations
The problem associated to Deﬁnition 1 has no closed form solution. However,
using a linear-quadratic approach allows to obtain an approximate character-
ization of the timelessly optimal stabilization policy at a ﬁrst order accuracy.
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non-stochastic steady state.
The constraints implied by the initial commitments X0 = X∗















0 is the inﬂation rate consistent with X∗
0 according to equation (66). Let
ψ1,t through ψ4,t denote the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to constraints
(66) through (69) and let −αψ∗
2,−1 −αψ∗
3,−1 denote the Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to constraints (71) and (72). Hence, the problem associated to

























where ψ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers and h(·) is deﬁned as








































For convenience the following deﬁnitions have been used
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the corresponding Lagrange multipliers and it can be interpreted as the marginal
gain of fooling agents at time zero.
Rearranging terms, the Lagrangian can be rewritten (up to a constant) in
the following discounted stationary form so that a time invariant system of ﬁrst





where g(·) is now deﬁned as








































(73) has the same form as the one used by Benigno and Woodford (2005)14 and it
can be immediately seen that their results apply to the case with non-atomistic
wage setters. Hence I refer to their paper in stating the following results.
Proposition 1: The non-stochastic steady state of the problem associated to
Deﬁnition 1 exists and is such that
K = F = (1 − αβ)−1
Π = ∆ = 1
Y = (1 − Φ)
1
1+φ
14see their Appendix B1
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where ˆ yt measures deviations of aggregate output from its steady state level and
the coeﬃcients entering equation (74) are
uyy = uya = uaa = (1 − Φ)(1 + φ)
uπ = (1 − Φ)
θp
λ
ua = (1 − Φ)
λ =
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
Note that when the steady state is distorted, a non-zero linear term appears
in (74), implying that you cannot evaluate utility to the second order using an
approximate solution for output that is accurate to ﬁrst order only. However,
the linear term can be substituted out using a second order approximation to
the aggregate supply (66)
Proposition 3: The second order approximation to lifetime utility (74) can be



































t + T0 (75)






















t )2 + (1 + φ)µw
t (ˆ yt − at)] (76)
where
vyy = vya = vaa = (1 + φ)2
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vy = (1 + φ)
ˆ xt = ˆ yt − ˆ y∗
t
ˆ y∗











is a deterministic component that depends only on the initial commitments on
the forward looking variables and that is predetermined at the time of the policy
choice.
These results can be used to derive a ﬁrst order approximation to the timelessly
optimal stabilization policy. Within a linear-quadratic framework the problem

















κ = λ(1 + φ)
˜ λ = κ/θp
Deﬁning ϕ as the Lagrange multiplier associated to the log-linear version of the
aggregate supply, the ﬁrst order conditions are
πt + ϕt − ϕt−1 = 0
˜ λˆ xt − κϕt = 0




(ˆ xt − ˆ xt−1) = 0 (77)















It can be shown that the characteristic equation
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has two roots µ1 and µ2 such that 0 < µ1 < 1 < µ2. Hence, equation (78) has a
unique bounded solution and





where µ ≡ µ1. If a process for the mark-up shock of the form (33) is assumed,
(79) becomes














Finally (81), together with the log-linear version of the Phillips curve and the
ﬁrst order conditions, determines inﬂation and output gap as a function of the
history of shocks and average distortion. In the timelessly optimal policy average









(82) can be interpreted as a ﬁrst order approximation to the marginal value of
deviating from the timelessly optimal policy.
C.2 Evaluation of suboptimal rules
Although expected lifetime utility as of time zero has been used in determining
the timelessly optimal policy, W0 cannot serve the purpose of evaluating policy
rules. This is because of the time inconsistency issue.
In a timeless perspective, initial commitments guarantee that policy conﬁrms
past expectations about current outcomes. However, it may be the case that the
optimal initial commitments are not feasible within the class of rules under con-
sideration. In turn the violation of initial commitments may give an advantage
to those rules, because of the usual time inconsistency that naturally arises in
any Ramsey problem.
Notwithstanding, it is undesirable to prefer rules that are improving the stabi-
lization trade-oﬀ by fooling the agents at the time of policy selection. Therefore,
Benigno and Woodford (2005) propose to use a welfare criterion that is still based
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timal commitments. In particular the criterion is modiﬁed in such a way that if
the class is ﬂexible enough to contain the timelessly optimal policy, then the rule
implementing the timelessly optimal policy is selected as the best one. Hence
the new criterion becomes





















Note that any rational expectation equilibrium that is maximizing (83) and is
satisfying the timelessly optimal commitments is by deﬁnition the timelessly op-
timal allocation. It is in fact the solution to the problems associated to Deﬁnition
1 and Deﬁnition 2. In addition the following result holds
Proposition 4: A second order approximation to the modiﬁed welfare criterion









































−1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the timelessly optimal policy
problem in its linear-quadratic version and π∗
0 is a ﬁrst order approximation to
the timelessly optimal initial commitment
Since the Lagrange multiplier depends on the history of shocks prior to the policy
choice, in the spirit of the timeless it is computed the unconditional expectation
of (84) integrating over all possible histories of the shocks

















































, (85) becomes (42).
D Appendix: Derivation of coeﬃcients fπ,a,
fπ,u, fx,a and fx,u





















TFP = −(1 − ρa)[I − ρaA]
−1 B
and




1+φ + λ(1 − Φ)C
i
it follows that fπ,a = TFP(2,1), fx,a = TFP(1,1), fπ,u = CP(2,1) and fx,u =
CP(1,1).




































π,u + ˜ λf2
x,u) (86)
From the solution of the Lagrange multiplier (81)
E{ϕt−1µw
t } = −
µλρuσ2
u
(1 − βρuµ)(1 − ρuµ)












(1 − βρuµ)(1 − ρuµ)
+ t.i.p.
= −fπ,uλΓ + t.i.p. (87)
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(1 − βρuµ)(1 − ρuµ)


















Using (86), (87) and (88) in (85), (54) can be immediately obtained.
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Figure 4: High RS, 3 Unions
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Figure 6: High RS, 3 Unions
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Figure 8: Medium RS, 2 Unions
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October 2006Table 1: Centralization of Collective Bargaining in OECD countries for the
period 1995-2000. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004. 1 = Com-
pany and plant level predominant; 2 = Combination of industry and company/plant
level; 3 = Industry level is predominant; 4 = Predominantly industrial bargaining,
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October 2006Table 2: Coordination of Collective Bargaining in OECD countries for the pe-
riod 1995-2000. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004. (a) The degree of
co-ordination includes both union and employer co-ordination. Each characteristic has
been assigned a value between 1 (little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations)
and 5 (co-ordination of industry- level bargaining by encompassing union confederation
or co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of wage
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Elast. Subst. Goods 11
Elast. Subst. Labor Types 11
Elast. Marginal Disutility Labor 1
TFP autocorrelation 0.95
TFP Std. Dev. Innovation 0.0071
Table 4: Cost Push Shock Calibration






Table 5: Optimal Monetary Policy
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October 2006Table 6: Welfare Costs of Deviation from Optimal Policy: High Cost Push
Shock Standard Deviation. The cost is measured relatively to the optimized rule. It
is expressed as the percentage decrease in the output process associated to the optimal


















Table 7: Welfare Costs of Deviation from Optimal Policy: Low Cost Push
Shock Standard Deviation. The cost is measured relatively to the optimized rule. It
is expressed as the percentage decrease in the output process associated to the optimal
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